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Americans have always mistrusted executive power, but only recently has “the unitary executive” emerged as the bogeyman of American politics. According to popular accounts, the idea of the unitary
1
executive is one of “presidential dictatorship” that promises not only
2
“a dramatic expansion of the chief executive’s powers” but also “a
3
minimum of legislative or judicial oversight” for an American Presi4
dent to exercise “essentially limitless power” and thereby to “destroy
the balance of power shared by our three co-equal branches of gov5
ernment.” Readers of the daily press are led to conclude the very
notion of a unitary executive is a demonic modern invention of po6
litical conservatives, “a marginal constitutional theory” invented by
7
Professor John Yoo at UC Berkeley, or a bald-faced power grab con8
jured up by the administration of George W. Bush, including, most
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ominously, Vice President Cheney. It is no surprise that the New York
Times agreed with then-candidate Joe Biden’s assessment that “Mr.
Cheney’s theory of the ‘unitary executive’” made him “the most dan10
gerous vice president we’ve had in American history.”
In fact, the theory of a unitary executive has nothing to do with
the extent of presidential power but only with who is to exercise those
powers, however broad, allocated to the executive. Its proponents
seek not to evade the limitations of separated powers, but rather insist—especially when dealing with the other branches—that the President alone is responsible for the actions of the executive branch.
The idea seems ominous today because so many functions have been
allocated to the now-fragmented executive branch that reuniting it
under presidential leadership seems to the present generation both
to enhance presidential authority unimaginably and to create an unmanageable administrative structure.
We suggest the “unitary executive” has fallen into ill repute and
apparent obsolescence not because of an executive bent upon autocracy but because of a legislature freed from the constraints of the
separation of powers. In Part I we introduce the nondelegation doctrine as a necessary corollary of the unitary executive and examine
the failure of the Supreme Court to enforce that doctrine. In Part II
we examine the similar failure of the President to resist encroachments by the Congress. In Part III we explore the implications of
these failures.
I.
No reader of this Journal will be surprised to hear that Dick Cheney did not originate the idea that the executive power should be
united under presidential control. That was part of the original con-
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See, e.g., Peter Baker, When 535 Take on Number 1, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at WK1 (“A
young Dick Cheney, chief of staff for the weak, unelected president who followed Nixon,
Gerald R. Ford, resolved when he returned to the White House a quarter-century later to
do all he could to restore that lost power. The ‘unitary executive’ theory he embraced
held that because the Constitution provides for only one executive branch, Congress
cannot intrude upon the president’s duties to manage the government. . . . With the acquiescence of a Republican Congress and a public eager to fight terrorism, Mr. Bush and
Mr. Cheney advanced their cause for years—the secret deliberations of an energy task
force; the Patriot Act; ‘signing statements’ that express reservations about enforcing a bill;
warrantless surveillance; unrestricted detention of terrorism suspects; the reinterpretation
of the Geneva Conventions.”); Jonathan Raban, The Golden Trumpet, GUARDIAN, Jan. 24,
2009, at R2 (condemning “the spectre of a dictatorial administration, emboldened by
Dick Cheney’s theory of the ‘unitary executive’”).
Editorial, Dick Cheney, Role Model, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A18.
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stitutional design. In fact, the provision of a unitary executive was a
response to the fear, seldom heard today, that the Congress would
become tyrannical. Indeed, for all the contemporary hysteria over
the unitary executive, few seemed to recognize, until Professors Cala11
bresi and Yoo began to publish their research on the subject, how
important the idea has been in American history. Contentious debate over the separation of powers and over the unitary executive in
particular has been a perennial feature of American politics, about
which the Founders left warnings worth revisiting today.
In The Federalist No. 51, Madison wrote, “[i]n republican govern12
ment, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.” His remedy for this tendency toward domination was to divide the legislature
into different chambers, while the executive was to remain unitary so
it would not be overmatched in its battles with the legislature. “As the
weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided,” explained Madison, “the weakness of the executive may re13
quire, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.”
Today, Madison’s warning seems quaint. Having seen the socially
14
transformative power of the courts, many scoff at Hamilton’s charac15
terization of the judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch. Editorialists, as we have seen, conclude the executive is the most powerful
16
branch and the legislature weak by comparison. Against this newly
received wisdom, we argue that Madison was right, and his modern
inversion mistaken.
We start with the simple reminder that the Framers of our Constitution did not establish a parliamentary system with a prime minister
dependent upon the national legislature. The President is not selected by the Congress; his salary is protected against any congressional diminution; and his term in office is fixed. Thus did our
Founders seek to establish a President who was more than an agent of
the legislature, as was the prime minister under the British constitution. To quote Madison again:
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See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id. at 319–20.
For contrasting views of the Supreme Court’s influence upon American society, compare
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990) with MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
(1998).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 464.
See, e.g., Senators Should Grill Court Pick, supra note 8.
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In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of
the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted
on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that
each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should
be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as
17
possible in the appointment of the members of the others.

The theory of the unitary executive focuses upon the extent to which
Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution—“The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”—protects the President’s authority to appoint, direct, and re18
move officers within the executive branch.
Complementing this
positive grant of authority to the President is the understanding that
the other branches would be confined to their own respective
spheres. A necessary corollary of the theory of the unitary executive,
then, finds expression in the nondelegation doctrine—the idea that
the Congress cannot delegate its lawmaking powers to the executive
or the judiciary. It is the demise of that doctrine that has allowed the
Congress both to augment and to fragment the executive branch by
establishing federal agencies within the executive tasked with making
policy pursuant to broad mandates from the Congress, agencies that
effectively exercise legislative power through rulemaking.
The nondelegation doctrine was once recognized as a founda19
tional principle of the separation of powers. Its roots go back to
John Locke, who put it this way:
[T]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have
it cannot pass it over to others. . . . The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can
be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to
make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power
20
to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.

Locke developed the nondelegation doctrine out of an elementary
maxim of the law of agency, delegata potestas non potest delegari—
21
delegated powers cannot be further delegated. Once the people
17
18
19

20
21

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 318.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”).
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141, at 81 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1952) (1690).
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 13 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1839); see also Shankland v. Mayor of Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390, 395 (1831)
(“[T]he general rule of law is, that a delegated authority cannot be delegated.”). But cf.
Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of
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had delegated the lawmaking power to the legislature, it could pass
no further lest it elude the people’s oversight.
Chief Justice Taft recognized the nondelegation doctrine as a fixture of American constitutional law. In J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
22
United States, the Court considered whether the Congress may delegate to the President the authority to raise or lower duties imposed by
the Tariff Act of 1922 in order to equalize differences between foreign and domestic costs of production. The Act specified the criteria
the President was to consider and required a prior investigation by
the Tariff Commission to inform the President’s decision. American
courts, especially state courts, had been grappling with the reach of
the nondelegation doctrine since the beginning of the Republic.
Chief Justice Taft drew upon their work in crafting his opinion, and
the cases he cited demonstrate how the importance of the nondelegation doctrine to the American constitutional system was well understood at the time.
In an 1852 case, the Supreme Court of Ohio had considered
whether the general assembly could require county commissioners,
upon a referendum of the public, to subscribe to the capital stock of
a private company established to build a new railroad and to issue
bonds in payment. The court started from first principles:
That the general assembly can not surrender any portion of the legislative authority with which it is invested, or authorize its exercise by any
other person or body, is a proposition too clear for argument, and is denied by no one. This inability arises no less from the general principle
applicable to every delegated power requiring knowledge, discretion, and
rectitude, in its exercise, than from the positive provisions of the constitution itself. . . . [W]hile it continues in force, every citizen has a right to
demand that his civil conduct shall only be regulated by the associated
wisdom, intelligence, and integrity of the whole representation of the
23
state.

Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1888 had considered
whether the state legislature could delegate to a commission the authority to set rates for common carriers that are “equal and reason24
able.”
The court first stated the common understanding of the
time:

22
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American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1929) (questioning the historical pedigree of the nondelegation maxim).
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St.
77, 87 (1852).
State of Minn. ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
Co., 38 Minn. 281, 282 (1888).
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It is, of course, one of the settled maxims in constitutional law, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
by that department to any other body. Where the sovereign power of the
state [referring here to the people] has located the authority it must remain. The department to whose judgment and wisdom this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by
choosing other agencies, and substituting their judgment and wisdom for
25
its own.

Despite its paean to the nondelegation principle in American law,
the Minnesota Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court of Ohio, upheld the challenged delegation of authority. In J.W. Hampton the Supreme Court followed suit, first extolling the nondelegation doctrine
26
but then upholding the challenged delegation. “The true distinction,” explained Chief Justice Taft, quoting the Ohio Supreme Court,
“is, between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
27
pursuance of the law.” To operationalize that distinction, Taft declared the Congress may authorize executive agents to carry out its
legislation as long as it “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized . . . is directed to
28
conform.”
Despite the careful line-drawing of the Chief Justice, the Supreme
Court has invoked this principle to strike down an act of Congress
exactly two times, both in the same year and with respect to the same
act. Section 9(c) of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act of
29
1933 (NIRA) authorized the President to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of petroleum products produced in excess of the amount permitted by state authority, but it did not define
the circumstances or conditions under which the transportation was
to be allowed or prohibited. Instead, the President was left to adopt
by executive order his own “Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry” to guide his decisions. In Panama Refining Co. v.

25
26

27

28
29

Id. at 299.
276 U.S. at 405–06 (“The well-known maxim ‘Delegata potestas non potest delegari’ . . . has
had wider application in the construction of our Federal and State Constitutions than it
has in private law. . . . [I]t is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives
up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch . . . .”).
Id. at 407 (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co., 1 Ohio St. at 88). The
Minnesota Supreme Court quoted the same passage. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n, 38 Minn.
at 300.
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
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30

Ryan, the Court adjudged section 9(c) an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. “As to the transportation of oil production
in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy,
has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which
the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited,” explained the
31
Court. “So far as this section is concerned, it gives to the President
an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the
32
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.”
That same year, the Court also considered the “Code of Fair
Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area
in and about the City of New York,” which, again pursuant to the
NIRA, had been proposed by the industry and adopted by the President in an executive order. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
33
States, the Court concluded, “[s]uch a delegation of legislative power
is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitu34
tional prerogatives and duties of Congress.” Justice Cardozo, who
had dissented in Panama Refining, now declared, “[t]his is delegation
35
running riot. No such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer.”
These decisions had momentous political consequences. The National Recovery Administration halted operations; the Congress temporarily stopped work on New Deal legislation and looked to the
36
White House for a response to the Court. President Roosevelt did
respond, with a lengthy press conference, angrily denouncing the
Court for crippling the federal government and imperiling the nation. “We have got to decide one way or the other,” he said, “whether
in some way we are going to . . . restore to the Federal Government
the powers which exist in the national Governments of every other

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 415.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
See Arthur Krock, Court is Unanimous: President Cannot Have ‘Roving Commission’ to Make
Laws by Code, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 1 (“At NRA headquarters officials and employees sat in gloom, wondering what is to become of them . . . .”); Richberg Issues Plea: He
Calls on Employers to Maintain Labor, Fair Practice Standards, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 1
(noting the demoralized atmosphere and the nervousness that abounded after the
Court’s decision in Schechter Poultry Corp.); Roosevelt Maps Moves: Congress at Standstill Waiting for Word on White House Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1935, at 1 (stating that the Congress
would engage in little if any business of note until the President addresses the nation).
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37

Nation in the world.” The President accused the Court of wanting
38
to revert to “the horse-and-buggy age.” Organized labor was out39
raged, but general public opinion divided because much of the
40
NIRA had been unpopular. A debate emerged in the public press
41
about judicial review and the role of the Court, and academics deliberated over whether “the ‘rule against delegation,’ as applied by
the Supreme Court, threaten[ed] to defeat the efforts of our political
democracy to use government as an instrumentality for the effective
42
control of our national economy.”
Ongoing confrontation with the political branches appeared too
perilous a course for the Court and, though it has never overruled
Schechter Poultry or expressly repudiated the “intelligible principle”
standard of J.W. Hampton, its standards for intelligibility have become
so flaccid that the Congress may now delegate authority to regulate
43
the private sector in “the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity’”
44
and to be “generally fair and equitable.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit played a modest
role in the last gasps of the nondelegation doctrine. In American

37
38
39
40
41

42

43

44

William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 347, 357 (quoting WASH. POST, June 1, 1935).
Otto Friedrich et al., The New Deal: FDR’s Disputed Legacy, TIME, Feb. 1, 1982, at 35.
See Louis Stark, Labor Leaders Much Disturbed, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 17 (“Organized
labor was dazed by the Schechter case decision today . . . .”).
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 971, 990–91 (2000).
See id. at 992–93 (“These 1935 decisions triggered a vigorous debate about the practice of
judicial review. There was, however, no clear opinion as to the appropriate outcome of
the struggle. At the end of that year, newspaper editors voted the debate about judicial
review and the Court’s encounter with the New Deal the year’s ‘biggest’ news story.”).
James Hart, Limits of Legislative Delegation, 221 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 87
(1942) (suggesting reinterpretation where “constitutional law that has been built upon
precedents which antedate the American industrial revolution is not well adapted to
modern circumstances and needs”).
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943) (“The criterion governing the
exercise of the Commission’s licensing power is the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity.’”); see also United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939) (upholding the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to fix prices for agricultural commodities at a level that will reflect economic conditions, “provide adequate quantities of
wholesome milk and be in the public interest”).
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (“[T]he Administrator is authorized . . . to promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities which ‘in his judgment
will be generally fair and equitable . . . .’”); see also 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.01 (1958) (“Much of the judicial talk about requirement of standards is contrary to the action the Supreme Court takes when delegations are
made without standards. The vaguest of standards are held adequate, and various delegations without standards have been upheld.”).
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45

Trucking Associations v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit considered the provision of the Clean Air Act that requires the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards for pollutants at a level “requisite to protect
46
the public health” with an “adequate margin of safety.” Because
47
ozone and particulate matter are nonthreshold pollutants, the EPA
lacked a determinate criterion for setting any particular limit. The
EPA’s construction of the Clean Air Act left it free to set air quality
standards at any point between zero and a concentration that would
48
yield a “killer fog.” The court held there was no intelligible principle in the Act to govern the decision of the EPA and remanded the
matter to the agency so that it might, if possible, construe the Act to
provide an intelligible principle by which to govern its decisions. On
further review, however, the Supreme Court concluded no such con49
struction was necessary. In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
the Court held the phrase “requisite to protect the public health” was
determinate enough to stand alongside its precedents upholding
50
statutes authorizing, for example, regulation “in the public interest.”
As the Court explained, “we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judg51
ment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”
True, but why? If nondelegation was so fundamental a principle
to our constitutional order—with roots in Lockean political philosophy and the very notion of popular sovereignty—why did it have so
little a constraining effect? Why are there no more than those two
cases from the first half of the twentieth century in which the Supreme Court found an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power? It is certainly not for want of opportunities. Rather, we submit,
the explanation lies in Madison’s warning about the predominance
of the legislature in republican governments or what we might today
52
call “the counter-majoritarian difficulty.”

45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52

175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457 (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
Nonthreshold pollutants are thought to pose some possibility of adverse health effects at
any level of exposure above zero.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1036 (referring to London’s “Killer Fog” of 1952).
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Id. at 472–74. But see David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That Elected Legislators
Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 272–83 (2003) (arguing the Court’s
interpretation of the Clean Air Act confined the EPA to regulating against “medically significant” risks in order to avoid a delegation problem).
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (citation omitted).
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
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If we look back to the nondelegation cases upon which Chief Justice Taft relied in J.W. Hampton, we see that the judges’ rhetorical enthusiasm for the nondelegation doctrine was overmatched by their
reluctance to confront the legislature. In the Cincinnati Railroad case,
for example, before the Court reached the nondelegation issue it devoted one-third of its opinion to justifying its authority to review an
act of the legislature for constitutionality—this some fifty years after
53
Marbury v. Madison. After noting that “[t]he Legislature is, of necessity, in the first instance, to be the judge of its own constitutional
powers,” the Court explained:
Doubt, in their case, as in that of the courts, should be conclusive against
all affirmative action. This being their duty, we are bound, in all cases, to
presume they have regarded it; and that they are clearly convinced of
their power to pass a law before they put it in the statute book. If a court,
in such case, were to annul the law while entertaining doubts upon the
subject, it would present the absurdity of one department of the government overturning in doubt what another had established in settled conviction, and to make the dubious constructions of the judiciary outweigh
54
the fixed conclusions of the general assembly.

The Minnesota Supreme Court similarly understood that the legislature’s role was to pass “[f]irst, on its authority to make the enact55
ment” and only second on its “expediency.” This view of the legislature’s role led to the conclusion that, as the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court had said in 1817, “[t]he legislature is, in the first instance, the judge of its own constitutional powers, and it is only when
manifest assumption of authority, or misapprehension of it, shall ap56
pear, that the judicial power will refuse to execute” the law. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court therefore announced its determination “never [to] declare a statute void, unless the nullity and
invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable
57
doubt.”
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania similarly denied the power of
the courts “to set aside a law, unless the legislature have encroached
on ground which they are positively or by necessary implication for-

53

54
55
56
57

See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE
BASICS 133 (2005) (noting judicial review “was specifically enshrined in some state constitutions, and it had been employed in both state courts’ and federal courts’ in actions
dealing with state statutes” prior to Marbury).
Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St.
77, 84 (1852).
State of Minn. ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
Co., 38 Minn. 281, 299 (1888) (emphasis in original).
Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 340, 345 (1817).
In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (1834).
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58

bidden to enter.”
Kentucky’s Court of Appeals agreed that “to
merely doubt legislative power is not enough to justify judicial resistance. This Court will not decide an act of the Legislature to be unconstitutional on a mere doubt, but they must be fully satisfied that it
59
is so.”
The United States Supreme Court early on expressed a similar hesitancy about declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional. As Justice Chase explained, “if the court have such power, I am free to de60
clare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case.” So, too,
Justice Washington: “[t]he presumption, indeed, must always be in
favour of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demon61
strated.”
And Justice Paterson: “to authorise this Court to pronounce any law void, it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
62
constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.”
Finally, in 1810 Chief Justice Marshall wrote,
[I]t is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature
is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be
considered as void. The opposition between the constitution and the law
should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their
63
incompatibility with each other.”

Indeed, it was none other than John Marshall—the author of Marbury
and the godfather of judicial review—who canonized this judicial deference to the legislature’s determinations of its own powers. “Let
the end be legitimate,” he wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland, “and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,

58
59

60
61
62

63

Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co., 1 Ohio St. at 85 (construing Commonwealth
v. M’Williams, 11 Pa. 61, 70 (1849)).
City of Louisville v. Hyatt, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 177, 178 (1841) (“[W]e should be justly
chargeable with wandering from the appropriate sphere of the judiciary department, were
we, by a subtle elaboration of abstract principles and metaphysical doubts and difficulties,
to endeavor to show that such a power may be questionable, and on such unstable and
unjudicial ground, to defy and overrule the public will, as clearly announced by the legislative organ.” (emphasis in original)).
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (emphasis in original).
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800).
Id. at 19; see also JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1893) (arguing
courts may not invalidate a law “as a mere matter of course,—merely because it is concluded that upon a just and true construction the law is unconstitutional. That is precisely the significance of the rule of administration that the courts lay down. It can only
disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question”).
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
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which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
64
constitution, are constitutional.”
That was Marshall’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
but consider the violence it does to the text. “Necessary and Proper”
is the language of strict scrutiny: the Congress may pass laws which
are necessary to secure a proper government interest; whatever is not
65
necessary is not authorized.
Marshall, however, transformed the
clause into a species of rational basis review: the Congress may pass
laws that are “adapted” (that is, rationally related) to any legitimate
66
government interest. And so the constitutional presumption of liberty was reversed. Instead of adhering to the constitutional design of
limited and enumerated powers—in short, the view that what the
Constitution does not authorize the National Government to do it
prohibits the National Government from doing—the courts decided,
rather than confront the legislature, that the National Government
may do whatever the Constitution does not prohibit. And who can
blame them? It would take some nerve for an unelected judge,
armed only with the power to persuade, to tell the people that a law
duly adopted by a majority of both chambers of the legislature and
signed by the executive will not be given effect because it is not, in
the judge’s opinion, “necessary” but merely “expedient.” And so the
counter-majoritarian difficulty (Madison’s republican tendency)
doomed the Necessary and Proper Clause and, along with it, the
nondelegation doctrine.
Justice Scalia explained this outcome in his dissent from Mistretta
67
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission over a challenge based
upon the separation of powers. “[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our
constitutional system,” Scalia reasoned that because “no statute can
be entirely precise, and that some judgments . . . must be left to the

64
65

66
67

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 313–14 (1993) (arguing the phrase
“necessary and proper” was originally “understood as a significant limitation on legislative
power”). Lawson and Granger document that the word “proper” was understood to require congressional statutes to conform to norms of federalism and separation of powers.
Randy Barnett has aptly denominated the presumption against legislative action “the presumption of liberty.” See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419. Marshall argues the Congress “may employ the
most convenient means.” Id. at 409.
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate
over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point
68
of principle but over a question of degree.” Such a determination
involves “multifarious and (in the nonpartisan sense) highly political”
considerations as to which the Congress and not the Court has the
69
institutional competence.
Among those considerations Scalia included “whether the Nation is at war” or faces some inchoate emergency, here referring to the D.C. Circuit case upholding wage and
70
price controls in the claimed economic emergency of 1971.
Although claims of emergency are indeed matters about which
the Court is properly hesitant to second-guess the political branches,
Justice Scalia’s explanation is not convincing. The separation of
powers is not a “highly political” consideration wisely left to the political branches but a fundament of the constitutional framework
within which our politics—and our political branches—are supposed
to operate. No meaningful concept even of necessity, much less of
emergency, could justify routine delegation of the lawmaking function to agencies and courts. What is needed (or what was needed, if
it is too late to rescue the nondelegation doctrine) is a Supreme
Court that heeds Madison’s warning about the propensity, in republics, of the legislative power to dominate the other branches of government and in response develops a judicially manageable standard
for distinguishing excessive or unjustified delegations from those
meeting, as Chief Justice Taft had put it, “the inherent necessities of
71
the governmental co-ordination.”
What is needed, in short, is a
68
69
70
71

Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 416.
Id.
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928); see Antonin Scalia, A
Note on the Benzene Case, REG., July-Aug. 1980, at 25, 28 (“[S]urely vague constitutional
doctrines are not automatically unacceptable. The Court’s opinions from obscenity to
church-state relations to the commerce clause are full of them. And the risk of vagueness
here [in applying the nondelegation doctrine] is much less than elsewhere.”); see also
Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 577
(1947) (“[N]early every doctrine of constitutional limitation has been attacked as vague.
Essentially the charges go to the institution of judicial review as we have it rather than
specifically to the delegation doctrine.”). Readers of the Constitution in the eighteenth
century understood the substantive distinction between legislative and executive power—
see Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 341 (2002) and Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 265 (2001)—and the Court routinely draws such a distinction in other contexts. See,
e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444 (1998) (holding cancellations pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act are “exercises of legislative power”); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (holding the one-house veto to be “legislative in purpose and effect”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 690 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) (“The function of making laws is peculiar to Congress, and the Executive can
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Court that recognizes that the nondelegation principle—although it
is, like judicial review itself, a predominantly structural rather than a
textual element—is no less a part of the judiciary’s charge to uphold
the Constitution. Instead, the judiciary, shrinking before the authority of the democratic legislature, has been complicit in allowing dele72
gation to run riot.

not exercise that function to any degree.”); Springer v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“[T]he legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection . . . .”);
cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“I believe that there are cases in which . . . the significance of the delegated decision is
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”); Indus.
Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 675
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[I]n my opinion decisions such as Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan suffer from none of the excesses of judicial policymaking that plagued some
of the other decisions of that era.” (internal citation omitted)).
Modern scholars have proposed various formulations of a judicially manageable
nondelegation principle. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE 136 (1995) (arguing courts should “demand as the prerequisite for legislative
action some meaningful level of normative political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate to judge its representatives”); DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 183 (1993) (arguing “a person interested in knowing whether the statute
prohibits any given conduct will, in most cases, get a clear answer from the statute that
states the law, but may well get no answer, for any particular case, from a statute that delegates”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1239 (1994) (arguing “the core of the Constitution’s nondelegation principle can be expressed as follows: Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them”).
72

The nondelegation doctrine is too essential a principle of American constitutionalism to
disappear entirely. It survives instinctively, if only as part of “the constitution in exile,” see
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REG., Winter 1995, at 83, 84 (reviewing
DAVID SCHOENBROD, supra note 71), appearing variously in the guise of the Due Process
Clause, see, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (holding the Congress
violated due process by authorizing a majority of coal producers to set regulations for
their entire industry because it “is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it
is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to
private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in
the same business”), or the “void for vagueness” doctrine, see, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (“Statutory language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so
abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.”), or the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, see, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952 (invalidating one-house veto that “was essentially legislative in purpose and effect”), or canons of
construction that cabin executive discretion, see, e.g., Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 641 (interpreting the Occupational Safety and Health Act to require the elimination of only “significant risks of harm”); see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315
(2000).
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II.
If the judiciary has failed to resist the encroachments of the Congress, then what can be said of the executive? In The Unitary Executive,
Professors Calabresi and Yoo remind us, with impressive scholarly detail, that every one of our nation’s Presidents has asserted his right to
73
direct the activities of the executive branch. But that only makes
one even more curious: how is it that, despite an unexceptioned line
of Presidents insisting upon the unity and independence of the executive, the executive branch could be transformed into a junior varsity legislature, issuing innumerable regulations according to no intelligible principle dictated by the Congress yet having, by judicial
interpretation, the force of law?
The fragmentation of the executive, despite both its unassailably
unitary pedigree and, as Calabresi and Yoo have documented, the uninterrupted efforts of American Presidents, can be a mystery only to
those who focus upon formal lines of authority rather than political
reality. Political scientists have long recognized that formally allocated “powers” are no guarantee of actual power. As Richard Neustadt trenchantly observed, “[t]he President of the United States has
an extraordinary range of formal powers, of authority in statute law
and in the Constitution. . . . [But] despite his ‘powers’ he does not
obtain results by giving orders—or not, at any rate, merely by giving
74
orders. . . . Presidential power is the power to persuade.”
In the normal course, Presidents have very little contact with
agency heads, let alone lesser policymakers within the agencies, and
hence very little opportunity to persuade them. Instead, the agency
policymakers interact with, are open to persuasion by, and become
clients of others: the congressional committees that oversee their
work, the industry they regulate, the trade press that reports their activities, and the permanent bureaucracy over whom they nominally
preside. These constituencies reinforce the natural tendency of an
agency, formed with a narrow mandate, to pursue a maximalist agenda within its own field of authority and without regard to competing
values, let alone the policy objectives of the rather remote President
75
of the United States. Those objectives are voiced through the regu73
74
75

CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 11.
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS
OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 10–11 (The Free Press 1990) (1960).
See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986) (“We all know that a government agency charged
with the responsibility of defending the nation or constructing highways or promoting
trade will invariably wish to spend ‘too much’ on its goals. An agency succeeds by accom-
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latory review program, nascent under President Nixon and maintained or expanded by every President since. Even regulatory review,
however, depends upon persuasion; the routine exercise of presidential authority would be counterproductive as it would antagonize both
the regulating agencies and their patrons in the Congress.
Considering the forces arrayed against the President within his
own branch of government, we recur to Madison’s insight that “the
weakness of the executive may require . . . that it should be forti76
fied.” Perhaps the greatest and most vigorous exponent of an expansive administrative state, Franklin Roosevelt, was acutely aware of
the need to shore up the executive against the Congress, as is highlighted by the episode, recounted in The Unitary Executive, concerning
the Brownlow Committee. Louis Brownlow, an architect of FDR’s
domestic policy, also served as chairman of his Committee on Administrative Management, which recommended (with the President’s enthusiastic support) the integration of the so-called independent
agencies into the executive departments. The Committee observed
that the Constitution “places in the President, and in the President
alone, the whole executive power of the Government of the United
77
States,” yet “governmental powers of great importance are being exercised under conditions of virtual irresponsibility” by regulatory
commissions beyond the President’s direction:
The commissions produce confusion, conflict, and incoherence in the
formulation and in the execution of the President’s policies. Not only by
constitutional theory, but by the steady and mounting insistence of public opinion, the President is held responsible for the wise and efficient
management of the Executive Branch of the Government. The people
look to him for leadership. And yet we whittle away the effective control
essential to that leadership by parceling out to a dozen or more irrespon78
sible agencies important powers of policy and administration.

The Committee concluded the so-called independent agencies
had become a “‘fourth branch’ of the government for which there is
no sanction in the Constitution” and which had begun to “defeat[]
the constitutional intent that there be a single responsible Chief Executive to coordinate and manage the departments and activities in

76
77
78

plishing the goals Congress set for it as thoroughly as possible—not by balancing its goals
against other, equally worthy goals.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 319–20.
THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 31 (1937).
Id. at 40.
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79

accordance with the laws enacted by the Congress.” The Committee
implicitly invoked the Lockean nondelegation principle that stood
behind the constitutional design: “[p]ower without responsibility has
no place in a government based on the theory of democratic control,” read its report, “for responsibility is the people’s only weapon,
80
their only insurance against abuse of power.” In other, more familiar words, the people having delegated legislative power to the Congress, that power could not properly be delegated further to un81
elected and hence potentially unaccountable agencies.
The Brownlow Committee’s recommendations represented the
executive’s attempt to maintain the constitutional separation of powers through a robust nondelegation doctrine, on the one hand, and a
unitary executive branch, on the other. Notably, the President said in
transmitting the report to the Congress:
What I am placing before you is not the request for more power, but for
the tools of management and the authority to distribute the work so that
the President can effectively discharge those powers which the Constitution now places upon him. Unless we are prepared to abandon this important part of the Constitution, we must equip the Presidency with au82
thority commensurate with his responsibilities under the Constitution.

79
80

81

82

81 CONG. REC. 187–88 (1937) (written statement of President Roosevelt, read by the President pro tempore).
THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT, supra note 77, at 40; see also Robert E. Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 24 CORNELL L.Q.
13, 33 (1938) (arguing “that one whose rights have been adversely affected by the exercise of unrestrained legislative discretion in the hands of an administrative officer or
agency is actually being deprived of liberty or property without due process of law”).
Cf. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 685
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine . . . ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social
policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will.”); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276–77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(arguing an executive officer’s judgment “is not a constitutionally acceptable substitute
for Congress’ judgment, in the absence of further, limiting guidance”); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (“The principle that authority granted by the legislature must be limited by adequate standards . . . insures that
the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official
but by the body immediately responsible to the people.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2368 (2001) (“The nondelegation doctrine . . . promote[s] distinctive rule of law values [because] legislative standards . . . provide notice, prevent arbitrariness, and facilitate judicial review.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 335–36 (1999) (arguing the nondelegation doctrine promotes “the kind of accountability that comes from requiring specific decisions from a deliberative body reflecting the views of representatives
from various states of the union”).
81 CONG. REC. 188 (1937) (written statement of President Roosevelt, read by the President pro tempore).
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To be more precise but less diplomatic, President Roosevelt was
asking not as much for authority commensurate with his responsibilities as for a rollback of the Congress’s encroachment upon his responsibilities. Roosevelt may not have opposed the expansion of executive authority, in the form of delegations from the Congress, but
he insisted that all executive activity should remain subject to presidential direction. The Congress, of course, did not agree to decolonize the executive.
In this respect, the New Deal really does represent what Cass Sunstein has called an “unfinished revolution,” though not in the way
83
Sunstein had in mind. Roosevelt wanted the authority of the executive dispersed among specialized agencies subordinate to the President, so the President would be presented with conflicting policy advice, disagreements, and options. That is precisely the circumstance
in which the President can most effectively exercise his power to persuade, as the ultimate decisionmaker, by mediating intra-branch disputes and shaping final agreements. As Carnes Lord has written,
Roosevelt “sought to maximize presidential control through fragmentation of bureaucratic authority and active encouragement of conflict
between individuals and agencies with unclear or overlapping man84
dates.” As Richard K. Betts put it, Roosevelt “dominated his burgeoning bureaucracies by politicizing them, by placing trusted lieutenants in middle-level positions, and by encouraging overlapping of
jurisdictions, proliferation of communication channels, and bureaucratic competition and conflict to force issues to the top, maximizing
85
the President’s range of choice.” Such policy leadership is impossible when important questions are resolved without ever reaching the
White House.
Roosevelt’s failure to finish his revolution left not only policy development but ultimate decision-making authority fragmented. As a
result, all that advice, all those disagreements and options, get filtered out by the agency head if not by the civil servants below him,
and a decision is reached without the President ever considering or
even being made aware of the issue, let alone balancing conflicting
priorities in keeping with his vision of national policy.

83
84
85

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004).
CARNES LORD, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY 29 (1988).
RICHARD K. BETTS, SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND COLD WAR CRISES 33 (1977).
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III.
Madison, of course, was right about the imperial instinct of the
legislature: “[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vor86
tex.” Neither the judiciary nor the executive has managed to resist
its force. Indeed, our system increasingly resembles the historical
British system of parliamentary supremacy that the Framers did not
adopt, despite their familiarity with its workings; there the executive
and the judiciary exercise distinct powers, but do so only as agents of
the legislature. Why, we might ask, did the Framers disfavor that system? What did they understand that we have lost?
First, consider accountability. The Clean Air Act provides a useful
illustration. The Congress amended the Act in 1970 to “force technological development” by requiring automobile manufacturers to effect a 90% reduction in pollution emissions within five years—with
87
devastating, industry-destroying penalties for noncompliance. The
Congress, not knowing whether achieving its goal was possible, but
not wanting to be blamed either for failing to reach it or for destroying the industry, delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) the authority to extend the deadline if necessary.
Various manufacturers applied for an extension in 1972, providing information to show the technical infeasibility of meeting the
deadline. The EPA Administrator decided the manufacturers’ analysis was faulty, substituted his own, found he was “unable” to determine whether effective control technology was possible, and consequently denied the companies’ applications.
The companies
petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit, and it fell to Judge Harold
Leventhal—a distinguished jurisprude but not much of a technoscientist—to evaluate data from five hundred test vehicles, comparing
the impact of noble metal monolithic catalysts with base metal pellet
catalysts, noble metal pellet catalysts, reactor systems, and various reactor/catalyst combinations in order to determine which methodol88
ogy was most appropriate and whether the technology was feasible.

86

87
88

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) supra note 12, at 306. Madison’s phrase does
not necessarily imply that the Congress becomes more powerful, only that its expanding
activity disrupts the balance of power; it is not always clear where political authority ends
up.
See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006)).
Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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The case, as Judge Leventhal put it, “taxes our ability to understand
89
and evaluate technical issues.”
More than that, it was the court of appeals—not the people’s representatives, not even the bureaucrats at the EPA—who balanced the
environmental costs of pollution against the economic costs to the
auto industry and decided whether to extend the deadline. To be
sure, the court did so with some trepidation. Leventhal prefaced the
court’s discussion of the EPA’s methodology “with admission of our
90
doubts and diffidence.” Again, later: “[i]t is with utmost diffidence
that we approach our assignment to review the Administrator’s deci91
sion on ‘available technology.’” For good measure, Leventhal concluded the opinion by noting, “[i]t is not without diffidence that a
court undertakes to probe even partly into technical matters of the
92
complexity of those covered in this opinion.”
Thus does the quasi-parliamentary system that has evolved result
in a government of buck-passing. The Congress can claim to have delivered clean air but disclaim the costs associated with achieving that
goal or, if there is no success, can disclaim responsibility for the fail93
ure. The hard decisions are too often left to the courts, which have
neither the legitimate authority nor the resources to evaluate complex policy matters or to balance the costs and benefits to American
94
society. Moreover, judicial decisions taken in this manner are made
with neither energy and dispatch nor with public deliberation, but—
as Judge Leventhal said—with “doubts and diffidence.”
89
90
91
92
93

94

Id.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 647.
As the Supreme Court has noted, the nondelegation doctrine prevents such unaccountability. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (“The clear assignment of
power to a branch . . . allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making,
or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance. [One]
strand of our separation-of-powers jurisprudence, the delegation doctrine, has developed
to prevent Congress from forsaking its duties.”).
Writing in 1980, then-Professor Scalia noted that because “judicial review of agency action
is virtually routine, it is the courts, rather than the agencies, that can ultimately determine
the content of standardless legislation.” Scalia, supra note 71, at 28. See also Indus. Union
Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that the divergent opinions of the justices over “whether the statistical
possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of
preventing those deaths. . . . demonstrate, perhaps better than any other fact, that Congress, the governmental body best suited and most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this litigation, has improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to this Court”); cf. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,
87 (1921) (noting that the power to define crimes “cannot be delegated either to the
courts or to the juries”).
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The Supreme Court, uncomfortable with the courts playing this
policy role, has adopted a posture of deference to the legal conclu95
Indeed, the Supreme Court in
sions of administrative agencies.
Chevron v. NRDC upbraided the petitioners for “waging in a judicial
forum a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agen96
cy . . . but one which was never waged in the Congress.” Chevron
took the courts out of such policy battles, but at the cost of greater
97
delegation to the agency. Take, as an example, the breadth of the
implicit delegation the Court discerned in the Endangered Species
Act, which makes it unlawful for any person to “take” an animal of an
endangered or threatened species. Applying Chevron, the Court held
that the EPA permissibly interpreted the word “take” to prohibit “significant habitat modification or degradation” because “to take” includes “to harm,” and the species could be harmed by altering the an98
imals’ habitat.
If an agency’s interpretation of the statute from
which it derives its authority is simply unreasonable, the courts still
may step in, as when the FDA asserted authority to regulate tobacco
99
products as drug-delivery devices. When a court intervenes, however, it is often deciding a question never considered by the Con100
gress. Whatever one thinks of Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the
Supreme Court ordered the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, the fact remains that the Congress never confronted the costs
and benefits of regulating carbon emissions.
The second thing the Framers understood is that democracy is
weakened when the locus of policymaking shifts from the Congress to
an agency and to the specialized congressional committees that oversee that agency—with aid, of course, from every affiliated pressure
group. As political scientist Theodore Lowi has argued, the delegation of policy problems to administrative agencies fosters “the atrophy of institutions of popular control” because agency heads exercise
their discretion in accordance with relationships between agencies

95
96
97

98
99
100

See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
See id. at 865–66 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”).
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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and interest groups rather than a full view of national priorities. To
solve the problem, Lowi counseled a return to “juridical democracy,”
which would mean limiting the federal role “to those practices for
which it is possible to develop a clear and authoritative rule of law,
enacted democratically and implemented absolutely” and asking the
Supreme Court to declare “invalid and unconstitutional any delegation of power to an administrative agency that is not accompanied by
102
clear standards of implementation.” Indeed, the point of the nondelegation doctrine was to keep the locus of lawmaking power in the
Congress, where the requirements of bicameralism and presentment
assure a connection to the public will. If the Congress had to vote on
the Code of Federal Regulations rule by rule, much if not most of it
surely would fail. Yet those rules have the force of law without the
Congress having voted at all. Instead, a phalanx of administrative officers in the executive branch, working most closely with their congressional oversight committees and the industries they regulate,
write the rules that govern the various spheres of American life.
Third, the Framers understood, and we have lost, the energy that
is the distinguishing characteristic of a unitary, independent executive. “That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed,” Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 70. “Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a
much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these quali103
ties will be diminished.” Indeed they have been. Jurisdiction over
the use and handling of formaldehyde, for example, is shared among
the EPA, the OSHA, the FDA, the CPSC, and HUD—each of which,
in its regulations, applies different methodological assumptions concerning key variables, such as the value of a statistical life, the level of
104
A report by
human exposure, and its effect upon human health.
the Government Accountability Office found “notable differences in
the . . . specific approaches, methods, and assumptions” of the EPA,
the FDA, and the OSHA in assessing risks of chemical exposure such
that “risk estimates prepared by different agencies, or by different
program offices within those agencies, may not be directly compara-
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THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 86–90 (1969).
Id. at 271, 297–98.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 422–23.
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REGULATION 46 (1993) (discussing the assumptions of risk exposure made by the EPA
and the OSHA in assessing individual risks).
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ble, even if the same chemical agent is the subject of the risk assess105
And these are not even so-called independent agencies;
ment.”
they are all squarely in the executive branch. Yet each carries out a
mandate from the Congress directly to the agency, and the congressional delegations displace unitary executive leadership. The lack of
presidential control over the independent agencies is explicit: so it is
that the Secretary of the Treasury, as the presidential agent who oversees the Comptroller of the Currency, can promise swift action to restore confidence in the banking system but cannot secure the coop106
eration of the independent FDIC, CFTC, or SEC.
In exchange for the loss of energy, the Progressive Era theory
107
goes, we get better government, that is, government by experts. In
principle, legislators make broad policy decisions and delegate to expert administrators responsibility for filling in the narrow technical
details. Again, this makes sense in a formal, legalistic way but, as the
political scientists know, the reality is different. The Congress cannot
simply delegate technical questions; modern administration involves
so many complex scientific, economic, and technological questions
that agency rulemaking involves the same kinds of policy choices, interest balancing, and power struggles that attend real lawmaking by
real legislatures. Nor does better legislation follow when technocrats
are left to make such decisions. As political scientist Robert Dahl has
written:
No intellectually defensible claim can be made that policy elites . . . possess superior moral knowledge or more specifically superior
knowledge of what constitutes the public good. Indeed, we have some
reason for thinking that specialization, which is the very ground for the
influence of policy elites, may itself impair their capacity for moral judgment. Likewise, precisely because the knowledge of the policy elites is
specialized, their expert knowledge ordinarily provides too narrow a base
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See Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, Geithner Vents as Overhaul Stumbles, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 2009, at A1 (reporting on the resistance of leaders of the Federal Reserve Board,
the FDIC, and the SEC to the administration’s proposal for financial regulatory reform
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(1948) (discussing the view that independent regulatory commissions developed to “fill a
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for the instrumental judgments that an intelligent policy would re108
quire.

For this reason, perhaps, most agency heads are not scientists, engineers, or other sorts of technical experts. They are political operatives. Consider the EPA: between 1970 and 2009, American Presidents appointed eleven administrators of the EPA, only two of whom
109
were scientists.
President Obama appointed a career environmental administrator trained as a chemical engineer, but then
tapped a lawyer-legislator and former EPA administrator to run cli110
mate change policy directly from the White House.
***
Surely President Obama, no less than his predecessors, wants to
determine the policies of the executive branch as he goes about the
execution of the laws. The President may not always resist delegations of authority to executive agencies, but at least when the Congress attempts to dictate policies to the executive and to those agencies, every American President has advanced the constitutional
111
principle that the executive is unitary.
Most recently, President
Obama has pursued two principal strategies to strengthen his control
over the executive. First, he has tried to insulate policymakers in the
executive branch from legislative control. In his first year he has appointed about twice as many “czars” as the Romanov dynasty had in
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of its eight administrators . . . were lawyers”). Since Schoenbrod made that observation,
President Bush appointed to the post two former governors and one scientist.
Press Release, President-Elect Barack Obama, President-Elect Barack Obama Announces
Key Members of Energy and Environment Team (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_announces_key_m
embers_of_energy_and_environmen/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (announcing the appointment of Carol Browner to the new White House post of Assistant to the President
for Energy and Climate Change); see also Tom Kenworthy, Activist Ex-Aide to Gore Tapped to
Direct EPA, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1992, at A10 (noting “Browner has the mind and training of an attorney-legislator but the soul of an activist”).
Justice Scalia has suggested that if “the scope of delegation is largely uncontrollable by
the courts, we must be particularly rigorous in preserving the Constitution’s structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation,” among which he counts presidential or at least
non-congressional control of the executive branch, because the Congress will hesitate to
delegate authority to officers it cannot control. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
416–17 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 421 (noting that “even after it has been accepted . . . that those exercising executive power need not be subject to the control of the
President, Congress would still be more reluctant to augment the power of even an independent executive agency than to create an otherwise powerless repository for its delegation”).
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300 years; they help to formulate the President’s policies on everything from economic recovery to domestic violence to peace in the
Middle East—and they operate outside the morass of congressional
112
oversight and agency rulemaking.
Second, like his recent predecessors, President Obama has taken
to issuing signing statements. During the 2008 presidential campaign, candidate Obama promised he would “sign legislation in the
light of day without attaching signing statements that undermine the
113
legislative intent” and would “not use signing statements to nullify
114
or undermine congressional instructions as enacted into law.”
Since assuming office, however, the President has pointed out that
Presidents have issued signing statements “[f]or nearly two centuries,” opined that “such signing statements serve a legitimate function
in our system,” and announced that he intends to continue the practice “when it is appropriate to do so as a means of discharging my
115
constitutional responsibilities.”
President Obama has so far employed signing statements to indicate he is not bound to press for certain policies within international
organizations, follow format requirements for budget requests, accept
congressional limitations upon his appointments to a commission,
condition American participation in United Nations peacekeeping
missions upon the approval of U.S. military leaders, or honor whistleblower protections for federal employees who give information to the
116
Congress.
Predictably, the czars and the signing statements have
112
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115
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raised hackles from the Congress, which understandably prefers to
117
But so does the President.
have its own way in matters of policy.
That, in the end, is the last and, for that reason alone, the best hope
for our system of separated powers. As Madison put it, “the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
118
resist encroachments of the others.” With the constitutional means
now lost, the great security has come down to personal motive—that
is, to the fortitude of the President.

the authority to bypass dozens of provisions of bills enacted into law since he took office,
provoking mounting criticism by lawmakers from both parties.”).
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